Tag Archive for lenin

LENIN, MAO FACING THE CHALLENGES OF HISTORY

samir amin at WAPE honory member and lifetime achievement

The 11th Forum of WAPE took place from June  17. – 19, 2016 in Patiala, Punjab, India. At this event Samir Amin took part in the Forum and was a main speaker. He also became an honorary member of WAPE and received a lifetime achievement award. Below is his speech given to the event which we reprint with his kind permission.

Lenin, Mao Facing the challenges of history

Samir Amin

Lenin,   Bukharin, Stalin, and Trotsky in Russia, as well as Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Den Xiaoping in China, shaped the history of the two great revolutions of the twentieth century. As leaders of revolutionary communist parties and then later as leaders of revolutionary states, they were confronted with the problems faced by a triumphant revolution in countries of peripheral capitalism and forced to “revise” (I deliberately use this term, considered sacrilegious by many) the theses inherited from the historical Marxism of the Second International. Lenin and Bukharin went much further than Hobson and Hilferding in their analyses of monopoly capitalism and imperialism and drew this major political conclusion: the imperialist war of 1914–1918 (they were among the few, if not the only ones, to anticipate it) made necessary and possible a revolution led by the proletariat.

With the benefit of hindsight, I will indicate here the limitations of their analyses. Lenin and Bukharin considered imperialism to be a new stage (“the highest”) of capitalism associated with the development of monopolies. I question this thesis and contend that historical capitalism has always been imperialist, in the sense that it has led to a polarization between centers and peripheries since its origin (the sixteenth century), which has only increased over the course of its later globalized development. The nineteenth century pre-monopolist system was not less imperialist. Great Britain maintained its hegemony precisely because of its colonial domination of India. Lenin and Bukharin thought that the revolution, begun in Russia (“the   weak link”), would continue in the centers (Germany in particular). Their hope was based on an underestimate of the effects of imperialist polarization, which destroyed revolutionary prospects in the centers.

Nevertheless, Lenin, and even more Bukharin, quickly learned the necessary historical lesson. The revolution, made in the name of socialism (and communism), was, in fact, something else: mainly a peasant revolution. So what to do? How can the peasantry be linked with the construction of socialism? By making concessions to the market and by respecting newly acquired peasant property; hence by progressing slowly towards socialism? The NEP implemented this strategy.

Yes, but…. Lenin, Bukharin, and Stalin also understood that the imperialist powers would never accept the Revolution or even the NEP. After the hot wars of intervention, the cold war was to become permanent, from 1920 to 1990. Soviet Russia, even though it was far from being able to construct socialism, was able to free itself from the straightjacket that imperialism always strives to impose on all peripheries of the world system that it dominates. In effect, Soviet Russia delinked. So what to do now? Attempt to push for peaceful coexistence, by making concessions if necessary and refraining from intervening too actively on the international stage? But at the same time, it was necessary to be armed to face new and unavoidable attacks. And that implied rapid industrialization, which, in turn, came into conflict with the interests of the peasantry and thus threatened to break the worker- peasant alliance, the foundation of the revolutionary state.

It is possible, then, to understand the equivocations of Lenin, Bukharin, and Stalin. In theoretical terms, there were U-turns from one extreme to the other. Sometimes a determinist attitude inspired by the phased approach inherited from earlier Marxism (first the bourgeois democratic revolution, then the socialist   one) predominated, sometimes a voluntarist approach (political action would make it possible to leap over stages). Finally, from 1930–1933, Stalin chose rapid industrialization and armament (and this choice was not without some connection to the rise of fascism). Collectivization was the price of that choice. Here again we must beware of judging too quickly: all socialists of that period (and even more the capitalists) shared Kautsky’s analyses on this point and were persuaded that the future belonged to large-scale agriculture.   The break in the worker-peasant alliance that this choice implied lay behind the abandonment of revolutionary democracy and the autocratic turn.

In my opinion, Trotsky would certainly not have done better. His attitude towards the rebellion of the Kronstadt sailors and his later equivocations demonstrate that he was no different than the other Bolshevik leaders in government. But, after 1927, living in exile and no longer having responsibility for managing the Soviet state, he could delight in endlessly repeating the sacred principles of socialism. He became like many academic Marxists who have the luxury of asserting their attachment to principles without having to be concerned about effectiveness in transforming reality.

The Chinese communists appeared later on the revolutionary stage. Mao was able to learn from Bolshevik equivocations. China was confronted   with the same   problems as Soviet   Russia: revolution in a backward country, the necessity of including the peasantry in revolutionary transformation, and the hostility of the imperialist powers. But Mao was able to see more clearly than Lenin, Bukharin, and Stalin. Yes, the Chinese revolution was anti-imperialist and peasant (anti-feudal). But it was not bourgeois democratic; it was popular democratic. The difference is important: the latter type of revolution requires maintaining the worker-peasant alliance over a long period. China was thus able to avoid the fatal error of forced collectivization and invent another way: make all agricultural land state property, give the peasantry equal access to use of this land, and renovate family agriculture.

The two revolutions had difficulty in achieving stability because they were forced to reconcile support for a socialist outlook and concessions to capitalism. Which of these two tendencies would prevail? These revolutions only achieved stability after their “Thermidor,” to use Trotsky’s term. But when was the Thermidor in Russia? Was it in 1930, as Trotsky said? Or was it in the 1920s, with the NEP? Or was it the ice age of the Brezhnev period? And in China, did Mao choose Thermidor beginning in 1950? Or do we have to wait until Deng Xiaoping to speak of the Thermidor of 1980?

It is not by chance that reference is made to lessons of the French Revolution. The three great revolutions of modern times (the French, Russian, and Chinese) are great precisely because they looked forward beyond the immediate requirements of the moment. With the rise of the Mountain, led by Robespierre, in the National   Convention, the French Revolution was consolidated as both popular and bourgeois and, just like the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, which strove to go all the way to communism even if it were not on the agenda due to the necessity of averting defeat, retained the prospect of going much further later. Thermidor is not the Restoration. The latter occurred in France, not with Napoleon, but only beginning in 1815. Still it should be remembered that the Restoration could not completely do away with the gigantic social transformation caused by the Revolution. In Russia, the restoration occurred even later in its revolutionary history, with Gorbachev and Yeltsin. It should be noted that this restoration remains fragile, as can be seen in the challenges Putin must still confront. In China, there has not been (or not yet!) a restoration.

Since 1947, the United States of America, the dominating imperialist power of that epoch, proclaimed the division of the world into two spheres, that of the ‘free world’ and that of ‘communist totalitarianism’. The reality of the Third World was flagrantly ignored: it was felt privileged to belong to the ‘free world’, as it was ‘non-communist’.   ‘Freedom’ was considered as applying only to capital, with complete disregard for the realities of colonial and semi-colonial oppression.   The following year Jdanov, in his famous report (in fact, Stalin’s), which led to the setting up of the Kominform (an attenuated form of the Third International), also divided the world into two, the socialist sphere (the USSR and Eastern Europe) and the capitalist one (the rest of the world).   The report ignored the contradictions within the capitalist sphere which opposed the imperialist centres to the peoples and nations of the peripheries who were engaged in struggles for their liberation.

The Jdanov doctrine pursued one main aim: to impose peaceful coexistence and hence to calm the aggressive passions of the United States and their subaltern European and Japanese allies.   In exchange, the Soviet Union would accept a low profile, abstaining from interfering in colonial matters that the imperialist powers considered their internal affairs. The liberation movements, including the Chinese revolution, were not supported with any enthusiasm at that time and they carried on by themselves.   But their victory (particularly that of China, of course) was to bring about some changes in international power relationships. Moscow did not perceive this until after Bandung, which enabled it, through its support to the countries in conflict with imperialism, to break out of its isolation and become a major actor in world affairs. In a way, it is not wrong to say that the main change in the world system was the result of this first ‘Awakening of the South’.   Without this knowledge, the later affirmation of the new ‘emerging’ powers cannot be understood.

The Jdanov report was accepted without reservation by the European communist parties and of those of Latin America of that era.   However, almost immediately it came up against resistance from the communist parties of Asia and the Middle East.   This was concealed in the language of that period, for they continued to affirm “the unity of the socialist camp” behind the USSR, but as time went on resistance became more overt with the development of their struggles for regaining independence, particularly after the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949.   To my knowledge, no-one has ever written the history of the formulation of the alternative theory, which gave full rein to the independent initiatives of the countries of Asia and Africa, later to crystallize at Bandung in 1955 and then in the constitution of the Non Aligned Movement (from 1960 defined as Asian-African, plus Cuba). The details are buried in the archives of some communist parties (those of China, India, Indonesia, Egypt, Iraq, Iran and perhaps a few others).

Nevertheless I can bear personal witness to what happened, having been lucky enough, since 1950, to participate in one of the groups of reflection that brought together the Egyptian, Iraqi and Iranian communists and some others.   Information about the Chinese debate, inspired by Zhou Enlai was not made known to us by Comrade Wang Hue (the link with the journal Révolution, whose editorial committee included myself) until much later, in 1963.   We heard echoes of the Indian debate and the split that it had provoked, which was confirmed afterwards by the constitution of the CPM.   We knew that debates within the Indonesian and Filipino communist parties developed along the same lines.

This history should be written as it will help people to understand that Bandung did not originate in the heads of the nationalist leaders (Nehru and Sukarno particularly, rather less, Nasser) as is implied by contemporary writers.   It was the product of a radical left wing critique which was at that time conducted within the communist parties.   The common conclusion of these groups of reflection could be summed up in one sentence: the fight against imperialism brings together, at the world level, the social and political forces whose victories are decisive in opening up to possible socialist advances in the contemporary world.

This conclusion, however, left open a crucial question: who will ‘direct’ these anti-imperialist battles?   To simplify: the bourgeoisie (then called ‘national’), whom the communists should then support, or a front of popular classes, directed by the communists and not the bourgeoisies (who were anti-national, in fact)?   The answer to this question often changed and was sometimes confused.   In 1945 the communist parties concerned were aligned, based on the conclusion that Stalin had formulated: the bourgeoisies everywhere in the world (in Europe, aligned with the United States, as in the colonial and semi-colonial countries – in the language of that era) have “thrown the national flag into the rubbish bin” (Stalin’s phrase) and the communists were therefore the only ones who could assemble a united front of the forces that refused to submit to the imperialist, capitalist American order.   The same conclusion was reached by Mao in 1942, but only made known (to us) when his New Democracy had been translated into Western languages in 1952.   This thesis held that for the majority of the peoples of the planet the long road to socialism could only be opened by a “national, popular, democratic, anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution [the language of the day], run by the communists.”   The underlying message was that other socialist advances were not on the agenda elsewhere, i.e., in the imperialist centres.   They could not possibly take shape until after the peoples of the peripheries had inflicted substantial damage on imperialism.

The triumph of the Chinese revolution confirmed this conclusion. The communist parties of South East Asia, in Thailand, Malaysia and Philippines in particular, started liberation struggles inspired by the Vietnamese model.   Later, in 1964, Che Guevara held similar views when he called for “one, two, three Vietnams.”

The avant-garde proposals for initiatives by the independent and anti-imperialist ‘countries of Asia and Africa’, which were formulated by the different communist groups of reflection, were precise and advanced. They are to be found in the Bandung programme and that of the Non-Aligned Movement, of which I gave a systematic presentation in my L’eveil du Sud (Awakening of the South).   The proposals focussed on the essential need to reconquering control over the accumulation process (development which is auto-centred and delinked from the world economy).

It so happens that some of these proposals were adopted, although with considerable dilutions in certain countries, as from 1955 to 1960, by the governing classes as a whole in both continents. And at the same time the revolutionary struggles waged by all the communist parties of South East Asia were defeated (except in Vietnam, of course).   The conclusion would seem to be that the ‘national bourgeoisie’ had not exhausted its capacity for anti-imperialist struggle.   The Soviet Union also came to that conclusion when it decided to support the non-aligned front, while the imperialist Triad declared open warfare against it.

The communists in the countries concerned were then divided between the two tendencies and became involved in painful conflicts that were often confused.   Some drew the lesson that it was necessary to ‘support’ the powers in place that were battling imperialism, although this support should remain ‘critical’.   Moscow gave wind to their sails by inventing the thesis of the ‘non-capitalist way’.   Others conserved the essentials of the Maoist thesis, according to which only a front of the popular classes that was independent of the bourgeoisie could lead a successful struggle against imperialism.   The conflict between the Chinese communist party and the Soviet Union, which was apparent as from 1957 but officially declared as from 1960, of course confirmed the second tendency among the Asian and African communists.

However, the potential of the Bandung movement wore out within some fifteen years, emphasizing – if it should be needed – the limits of the anti-imperialist programmes of the ‘national bourgeoisies’.   Thus the conditions were ripe for the imperialist counter-offensive, the ‘re-compradorisation’ of the Southern economies, if not – for the most vulnerable – their recolonization. Nevertheless, as if to give the lie to this return imposed by the facts to the thesis of the definitive and absolute impotence of the national bourgeoisies – Bandung having been, according to this vision, just a ‘passing episode’ in the cold war context – certain countries of the South have been able to impose themselves as ‘emerging’ in the new globalization dominated by imperialism.   But ‘emerging’ in what way?   Emerging markets open to the expansion of capital of the oligopolies belonging to the imperialist Triad? Or emerging nations capable of imposing a genuine revision of the terms of globalization and reducing the power exercised by the oligopolies, while reconducting the accumulation to their own national development?     The question of the social content of the powers in place in the emerging countries (and in the other countries of the periphery) and the prospects that this opens up or closes is once again on the agenda.   It is a debate that cannot be avoided: what will – or could – be the ‘post-crisis’ world?

Would the results be better now, when a second ‘Awakening of the South’ is on the horizon?   Above all, will it be possible this time to build convergences between the struggles in the North and in the South?   These were lamentably lacking in the Bandung epoch. The peoples of the imperialist centres then finally aligned behind their imperialist leaders.   The social-democrat project of the time would in fact have been difficult to imagine without the imperialist rent that benefited the opulent societies of the North.   Bandung and the Non Aligned Movement were thus seen as just an episode in the cold war, perhaps even manipulated by Moscow. In the North, there was little understanding of the real dimensions of this first emancipatory wave of the countries of Asia and Africa which, however, was convincing enough for Moscow to give it support.

 

politicaleconomy.ie interview with Ernst Herzog and Richard Corell

German-troops-Herero

Both authors are scholars of political economy and members of the World Association for Political Economy (WAPE). As freelance researchers and journalists they publish also in left-wing papers (like KAZ or Junge Welt) in the FRG. In the World Review of Political Economy (Pluto Journals) they have published: “Financial and Currency Crisis Undermines the Euro and National Sovereignty”, Summer 2011; “Where Will the Euro-crisis Take US To: Germany´s Third Attempt?” (Together with Stephan Müller), Spring 2012 and “Subprime Crisis and Marx´s Theory on Ground Rent”, Summer 2014.

Full interview on PDF here Interview with Ernst Herzog and Richard Corell

Q: You quote Lenin on a United States of Europe being impossible or reactionary. Well it exists now so what do you make of the European Union and how do you define it?

A: Today we can say that the more the United States of Europe become a real possibility, the more reactionary they become.

After two world wars, after the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community, after the foundation of the EEC and finally the European Union (EU), in 1998 there began a currency union between several of the EU member states. The introduction of the euro currency is based on a temporary compromise of the ruling classes of the monopoly bourgeoisies of France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The intention is:

  • To strengthen their position against the US and Japan
  • To share out together the Eastern parts of Europe after the crush of the USSR (Russia, part of Europe is excluded from the EU by the imperialists)
  • To oppress small capitalist nations in Western Europe
  • To also oppress any resistance by the European peoples and the working-class
  • To make a stand against socialist China

We call this alliance reactionary, backward-looking and hostile to any social and democratic progress. It attempts to preserve, defend and indeed strengthen capitalism, a socio-economic system which is obviously past its time.

Eastern European states, annexed to the EU after 1989 including the German Democratic Republic, as well as smaller capitalist countries affiliated to the EU, are economically dependent on EU imperialist states because of their size and their own national industrial and banking system, as yet not fully developed. While French and German imperialism endeavour to strengthen their dominant position through the EU and to create, for example, an “economic government” of European countries, those states are becoming increasingly dependent politically. Their national sovereignty is increasingly endangered. In this context, to make a clear difference between nations which oppress other nations and those nations which are oppressed is manifestly sensible. Yet the European Union is neither a new nation nor a new state. It is, in fact, the agency of historically notorious imperialist states in Europe—a temporary alliance with developing major internal contradictions.

The obvious contradiction between oppressor and oppressed nations is concretely demonstrated in the manner in which EU member states Greece and Ireland were dealt with after the outbreak of financial and economic crises.

Q: You emphasise the role of the State as a key structure in the system and describe it is a ‘state of usurers’.  What do you mean by this?

A: Writing “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” in 1916, Lenin develops the term “rentier state” or “usurer state.” “Imperialism is an immense accumulation of money capital in a few countries… Hence the extraordinary growth of a class, or rather, of a stratum of rentiers, i.e. people who live by ‘clipping coupons’, who take no part in any enterprise whatever, whose profession is idleness.” Imperialist states become rentier states in which a perpetually growing part of the bourgeoisie lives by lending money, or in other words by investing money, buying and selling bonds and shares, gaining interest and dividends, and the world “has become divided into a handful of usurer states and a vast majority of debtor states.” “The rentier state is a state of parasitic, decaying capitalism.” The cause thereof is:

The surplus value extracted from the working class within the capitalist countries finds lesser fields for being reinvested in productive manner, in industrial and rural production. It exists as money-capital in the hands of the rich eager for interest, after all for fixed income on the highest possible level. They have the banks, their consultants and their governments to guarantee an effortless and riskless life. This development encroaching on those countries makes them living more and more from fixed income, from the tributes or the rents they gain with different forms of credits, loans, bonds, shares and other forms of fictitious capital from outside their countries. The development of a so-called service society based on a tremendous deindustrialisation in the last four decades proves well Lenin’s concept of the usurer state.

The imperialist state, still existing in the form of a national state and not able to overcome this form, has the task to secure the dominant role of the monopoly bourgeoisie internally against the working class and to safeguard the interests of the monopolies externally against the imperialist competitors. After the financial crisis 2008 the rentiers (investment banks, hedge funds, etc. with the rich families behind them) used the governments and the state apparatus to pass on their losses to the working people.

Q: Marx’s theory on ground rent has renewed relevance in the context of the crisis today. What is the connection between the monopoly of land ownership in Marx’s time and the monopoly of land/housing today?

A: Marx was the first economist who developed a general “theory of ground rent”. This theory, reflecting the relationship between the three classes (labourers, capitalists and landowners) of bourgeois society, is valid for all capitalist relations of production, also today. Marx underlines: “With a correct conception of rent, the first point to arise was of course that it does not originate from the land but from the product of agriculture, that is, from labour, from the price of the product of labour, for instance of wheat; in other words, from the value of the agricultural product, from the labour applied to the land, not from the land.”

With his theory of the ground rent Marx has developed a profound theory of monopoly. He shows some consequences of this exclusive power of disposal of parts of the planet.

Since Marx`s times, capitalism has changed into monopoly capitalism.

Besides the monopoly of land ownership, which came into existence with the capitalist system, since the last third of the 19th century, monopolies have developed in the sectors of industry, trade and finance.

Under monopolist-capitalism, superseding capitalism with freedom of competition, monopolies come into existence in industry, bearing features previously subject to private property. They represent obstacles to non-monopolistic capital penetrating their markets. They can realize prices exceeding the value and realize monopolistic profits, above average rate of profit. They impose a tribute on society chargeable to the working class, the petty bourgeoisie and the non-monopolistic bourgeoisie. By their ambition to rule world-markets, monopolies stamp down the autonomic development of bourgeoisies and capitalism in many countries worldwide too. To safeguard their rule, monopolies form an alliance with semi-feudal big landowners in the less developed countries in the same way as they did in imperialist countries before. The monopolists of industry and banks, the financial oligarchy, form an alliance with the big landowners; even so the contradictions between them are not sublated. In dominating the access to land they can decide whether a piece of land is used or not used for building houses or whether wells of crude oil or other sources of raw materials are exploited or not.

Insofar the survival of the monopoly on private property of land is closely related to the survival of the financial capital and both contribute to increasing parasitism and decay of imperialism. At the same time however, contradictions between the factions of monopolists are not overcome, as soon as it concerns the share of the tribute, or the prey, and the transfer of losses resulting of crises.

Since the time of Marx these contradictions have increased, prices for housing in cities grew exorbitant, a growing number of humans are living in slums, land grapping takes place in big dimensions, wars about raw materials are on the increase as well as debt bondage for a growing number of people by mortgage loans, etc. These mortgage loans and their financialisation played a major role in the development of the 2008 crisis as described in our article in WRPE, (World Review of Political Economy; Vol. 5, Nr. 2, Pluto Journals),

Q: You draw interesting connections between finance capital, low interest rates, the price of land and the underdevelopment of peripheral countries today. Can you explain this?

A: Though, unworked land has no value, because it is not a product of human labour, it is the object of buying and selling. The reason for that is the historic transformation of land into private property. Buying and selling of land creates per se not a cent in favour of land fertility, new machinery, or jobs. On the contrary buying and selling deprives resources of productive use.

For the owner of the ground, price for land is principal rent for a certain period of use. The principal amount of rent must at least yield the same rate of return, as the rate of return of savings deposits for the same amount of money would deliver.

“It follows, then, that the price of land may rise or fall inversely as the interest rate rises or falls if we assume ground rent to be a constant magnitude” (Marx). The price of land is all the higher, the higher the rent and the lower the interest rate.

If the interest rate by tendency approaches zero— and the real interest rate (adjusted by the rate of inflation) had this tendency since the nineteen eighties—price for land tends to go to infinite and this is regardless whether ground rent has  the form of rent, lease or other forms. The same principle also explains why Warren Buffet and others were on solid ground at first glance, thus negating the risk of decreasing prices for land as a result.

The tendency of price of land to rise is also supported by other facts. Beside the “growing demand for shelter” Marx states “. . . agriculture becomes relatively less productive in relation to the industrial product the value of the agricultural product rises and so increases ground rent”. Similarly, the like has to be considered for the building industry which, in spite of important technical achievements, is still relatively underdeveloped (low organic composition of capital) and contributes therefore to an increasing rent.

The financial capital penetrates the sphere of landed property and ground rent more and more. The main connecting piece thereby is the institute of mortgage and the instrument of mortgage loans. These allow increasing control of landed property and access to land by the financial capital. After the expropriation of land in the present imperialist countries in former decades; in the period of “globalisation” the banking system and the mortgage loans were used by the financial capital to export capital in underdeveloped countries. This led to expropriation of farmers, small industries and parts of the national bourgeoisies in those countries by the take-over of agricultural land, mines and wells of resources and building sites in Asia, Africa, South America, etc. by multinational companies. In most of these cases the borrowers could not serve their loans after diverse crises broke out (currency, prices for raw material, etc.) triggered by speculations of the financial capital in those countries. Then the financial capital took over to extract more surplus value from those countries.

Q: How does Germany fit into this within the Eurozone?

A: To become a world power again, Germany pursuit mainly three goals. First goal was reached through the annexation of the GDR in 1989/90. Second goal was, to expand its influence to the eastern countries (former part of the Warsaw Pact); this happened by exporting goods and capital to those countries and through their integration into EU. And thirdly it tries to become the leading power within the EU to make a stands against the US and the US$.

Making large-scale dealings in real estate in the former GDR and former Warsaw Pact countries, taking over the important parts of their banking system and using the well-trained industrial workers from the GDR to dump the wages domestically, German imperialism developed new strength with the consequence that the German business models are becoming more unbalanced and hazardous.

As the US-investment banks had socialised the risks of MBS and CDOs by securitisation, rating and selling this bonds to banks and investors all over the globe; also German banks were involved in this crisis from 2008 on heavily. While Deutsche Bank was part of the party issuing those AAA rated but then defaulting bonds; other German banks – as well as most banks in the EU – were hit massively by those losses and are under the guarantee of the state. The row about sharing the losses was intensive. Neither the German banking system nor that of the EU has properly recovered from this. Still governments and media are forced to tell different versions about the same facts. While Irish people know that their government (by issuing guarantees for the banks and, under the pressure of the Troika, paying back the speculative money to the big US, German, French and British investors) has saved also the German banks; in Germany, people are told Germany had saved the Irish State and banks. Germany is the main power using its influence on the ECB to put on the losses of the crisis to the smaller European countries and to the working people in the EU.

Also, contradictions between the German imperialism and the US imperialism have increased since the outbreak of the crisis.

Q: Is it not overdramatic to suggest this is Germany’s third attempt to become a world power?

A: The question here is, how could German imperialism, after it had missed out during the sharing of the world between the Great Powers in the 19th century and after it had tried 1914 in the First World War to push through a redistribution of the world for its own benefit according to its economic strength and how could it to a day 65 years after its defeat by May 8th 1945 climb in such a position again (being the leading power in “solving” the Euro-crisis). Where does the power, where does the strength of financial sources result from? How did German tycoons succeed after their defeat 1945 not only to survive, under protection of the dominating capitalist power US, but also to soar into a leading imperialist power again?

On the one hand they could use the contradiction between the socialist and the capitalist camp, which developed after 1945 into cold war. On the other hand the crippled German financial oligarchy could profit on the fact that the French imperialists had get under US-hegemony too and wanted to get rid of US supremacy again. Together with the US the German tycoons perused the split of Germany and of Europe by introducing the Marshall-plan, European Steel and Coal Community and the EEC. In coalition with France they transferred the EEC into the EU to dominate Europe und to rival with the US.

The basis for the present position of German imperialists during this period was that its capital accumulation was growing faster as those of their competitors that is to say, they have been forced and they are forced to make higher profits.

Starting from scratch 1948 without government debt, more modern production facilities and lower wage costs German Imperialism became the strongest power in Western Europe from the 1970s on. As mentioned before, the annexation of the GDR and the expansion to the East later strengthened the German position enormously.

Currently, the result is that the US is still the most powerful imperialist state which has the largest economy, based on, by far, the  biggest military potential. However, it has become more difficult to force its will on the other capitalist countries. In the present development the US will continue to lose influence as leading power of the capitalist world.

We want to try to answer your question with another question. Which alternative has an imperialist country like Germany, driven by its big monopolies – which are in need of markets and raw materials to realise profits – as to take this path to become a world power again? What is different to the situation of the first and the second attempt?

Behaving like an imperialist world power can be seen in the handling of the Greek debt crisis, dictating austerity policy for all EU-countries a. s. o. As Germans we know what aspirations for supremacy meant to our people and for other peoples. That is why we try to reveal the truth on this new attempt and to fight against it together with all true patriots.